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ÖZET
Münih Eyalet Yüksek Mahkemesi’nin (Oberlandesgericht München) 15 Ocak 
2015 tarihli kararı, Spor Tahkim Mahkemesi’nin (CAS) verdiği kararların güvenilir-
liği ve tenfiz kabiliyeti konusunda birçok tartışmaya neden oldu ve özellikle CAS’ın 
kurumsal yapısı tartışmaya açılmış oldu. Alman sürat patencisi Claudia Pechstein ve 
Uluslararası Buz Pateni Federasyonu (ISU) arasındaki ihtilafta, Münih Eyalet Yüksek 
Mahkemesi (Oberlandesgericht München), taraflar arasındaki tahkim sözleşmesinin 
geçersiz olduğuna hükmetti ve dolayısıyla, bu tahkim sözleşmesine dayanılarak veri-
len CAS kararının, Alman mahkemeleri önünde kesin hüküm niteliği taşımadığını 
karara bağladı. Bu karar, ISU tarafindan, Almanya Federal Adalet Mahkemesi (Bun-
desgerichtshof) nezdinde temyiz edildi ve temyiz talebi henüz karara bağlanmadı. Eğer 
Federal Mahkeme, Eyalet Mahkemesi tarafindan verilen kararı onarsa, bu CAS’ta 
çok önemli yapısal reformların habercisi olabilir. Bu makale, Eyalet Mahkemesi’nin 
vermiş olduğu karar inceledikten sonra; Avrupa Birliği rekabet hukuku yönünden, 
davanın olası yorumlarına değinmektedir.  
Anahtar Kelimeler: Spor Tahkim Mahkemesi, Pechstein, kesin hüküm, kurumsal 
yapı.
ABSTRACT
A decision of the Oberlandesgericht München (OLG), dated January 15, 
2015, created a lot of controversy on the reliability and enforceability of awards 
rendered by the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS), in particular by opening 
the institutional structure of the CAS up for discussion. In the dispute between the 
German speed skater Claudia Pechstein and the International Skating Union (ISU), 
the OLG decided that the arbitration agreement between the parties was null and 
void and therefore the award of the CAS Panel, which relied its jurisdiction on this 
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arbitration agreement, did not have res judicata effect before German courts.1 This 
decision was appealed by the ISU to the German Supreme Court (Bundesgerichthof) 
and the latter still has not rendered its decision. If the Bundesgerichthof upholds the 
decision of the OLG, this could give rise to important structural reforms in the CAS. 
This article analyzes the findings of the OLG and lays down possible interpretations 
of the case from the perspective of the European Union competition law.
Keywords: Court of Arbitration for Sport, Pechstein, res judicata, institutional 
structure.
Introduction and Factual Background 
Claudia Pechstein is an Olympic gold medalist speed skater who was held 
liable for an anti-doping violation by the Disciplinary Commission of the ISU. After 
a decision imposing two-year disqualification, Pechstein initiated appeal arbitration 
proceedings before the CAS, which dismissed her appeals and upheld the decision 
of the international sports federation. After the CAS award, Pechstein made two 
separate applications to the Swiss Federal Supreme Court. The first one was to set 
aside the award and the second one was for its revocation. However, both applications 
of the athlete were dismissed. 
Following these proceedings, Pechstein filed an action for damages against the 
ISU before the Landgericht München I (LG). She claimed for her economic losses 
due to the two-year disqualification and in order to prevent the res judicata effect 
of the CAS award, she alleged that the arbitration agreement was invalid. The LG 
granted her motion on the invalidity of the arbitration agreement because it was 
unilaterally imposed by the sports federation but still recognized the res judicata effect 
of the CAS award, since Pechstein had not raised an objection to the CAS Panel’s 
jurisdiction throughout the proceedings. 
Pechstein appealed the decision to the OLG, which rendered an interim 
decision and stated that the arbitration agreement was invalid and the CAS award 
would not have res judicata effect because its recognition would be a violation of the 
German public policy on the grounds of the “Act Against Restraints of Competition” 
(Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbbeschränkungen). The decision of the OLG was based on 
the findings that the ISU abused its dominant position by imposing the arbitration 
agreement unilaterally and that the neutrality of the CAS was in question due to its 
1 Oberlandesgericht München, 15 January 2015, Az. U 1110/14 Kart., available at https://openjur.
de/u/756385.html (last visited 2 February 2016). 
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“structural imbalance in favor of the sports federations”2. This interim decision was 
appealed by the ISU to the German Supreme Court (Bundesgerichthof) and the 
latter has not yet decided on the case. Despite that, the decision of the OLG caused 
an earthquake effect in sports law because if it were upheld by the Bundesgerichthof, 
this would open the way for the athletes to challenge the enforceability of CAS 
awards before national courts. Apparently, it will also trigger the questions related to 
the compatibility of the rules imposed by the monopolist sports governing institutions 
with European Union (EU) competition law.
Res Judicata Effect of the CAS Award in Germany
Pursuant to Article R28 of the CAS Code, the seat of arbitration of the CAS 
is Lausanne, Switzerland and therefore the CAS arbitration proceedings will be 
governed by the Swiss arbitration law. Chapter 12 of the Swiss Federal Statute of 
Private International Law (PIL) contains provisions on international arbitration and 
its Article 176 defines the field of this chapter’s application as follows: “The provisions 
of this chapter shall apply to all arbitrations if the seat of the arbitral tribunal is in 
Switzerland and if, at the time of the conclusion of the arbitration agreement, at least 
one of the parties had neither its domicile nor its habitual residence in Switzerland.” 
As both conditions are fulfilled in the given case, there is no controversy on the 
application of Chapter 12 of the PIL. 
Article 191, which is within the same chapter, prescribes that the sole forum 
to file an action to set aside an arbitral award is the Swiss Federal Supreme Court. 
However, as Pechstein’s applications to set aside and revoke the award were dismissed 
by the Swiss Federal Supreme Court, her solution to challenge the CAS award was 
to initiate new proceedings with a claim for damages against the ISU before German 
courts. Although the prayer for relief was different from the one before the CAS 
Panel, it was obvious that the German court’s analysis would mean a de novo review 
of the matter already decided by the CAS.3 
Despite that, the OLG did not dismiss the case and declared that the CAS 
award did not have res judicata effect on grounds of Article V (2) (a) of the New 
York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards. 
The court’s reasoning was that the unilateral imposition of the arbitration agreement 
by the ISU constituted a violation of the German public policy, i.e. the antitrust 
2 Favre-Bulle, X., ‘Pechstein v. Court of Arbitration for Sport: How Can We Break The Ice’, in New 
Developments in International Commercial Arbitration 2015, Geneva/Zurich 2015, p. 315 at 323 (Mül-
ler, C. et al. eds.). 
3 Id., p. 327.
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law that “bans an undertaking placed in a dominant position from imposing 
contractual conditions that differ from what they would be in a normal competitive 
environment”.4
Monopolistic Position of Sports Governing Bodies
The “Act Against Restraints of Competition” prescribes that an undertaking 
shall be deemed as dominant in a given market, if “it has no competitors or is not 
exposed to any substantial competition, or has a paramount market position in 
relation to its competitors”.5 In its decision, the OLG determined that the ISU has 
a monopolistic position given the fact that it is the only supplier in the market for 
ice skating world championships. It is a matter of fact that almost all national and 
international sports federations have this monopolistic position in order to maintain 
the uniformity of the rules and the organization of competitions in the given sports 
area. This dominant position of the sports federations goes thus far that they are 
deemed to have a quasi-state power over their members, which can be compared to the 
power of a state over its citizens.6 Within this framework, it is almost impossible for 
the athletes not to accept the conditions and rules imposed by the sports federations 
because otherwise they would not be able to take license or attend the competitions 
organized by these federations. 
It is undisputable that the athletes do not freely consent to arbitration 
agreements but these are imposed upon them by the sports federations and the 
Olympic committees.7 The question is whether this unilateral imposition constitutes 
per se an abuse of the dominant position or can be justified by legitimate purposes 
given the specificity of sports. The prevailing opinion that was also crystallized in the 
case law is the second one. The rules and arbitration agreements imposed unilaterally 
by the sports governing bodies are deemed as valid, as long as they have legitimate 
objectives such as “good progress and operation of the sport competitions”, “equal 
opportunities for the athletes” and “timeliness of dispute resolutions”.8 
4 Duval, A., ‘The Pechstein Ruling of the Oberlandesgericht München – Time for a New Reform of 
CAS?’, Asser International Sports Law Blog (19 January 2015), available at: http://www.asser.nl/Sport-
sLaw/Blog/post/the-pechstein-ruling-of-the-oberlandesgericht-munchen-time-for-a-new-reform-of-
cas (last visited 2 February 2016).
5 Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbbeschränkungen, § 19, para. 2, English translation available at http://www.
gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_gwb/englisch_gwb.html (last visited 2 February 2016).
6 Rigozzi, A., ‘L’arbitrabilité des Litiges Sportifs’ in ASA Bulletin, Vol:21, No:3, p. 501 at 530-531, 
available at http://www.kluwerarbitration.com/CommonUI/document.aspx?id=ipn25118 (last visited 
2 February 2016).      
7 Pinna, A., ‘Les Vicissitudes du Tribunal Arbitral du Sport’, Gaz. Pal., 19-20 May 2014, p. 38, quoted 
in Maisonneuve, M., L’Arbitrage des Litiges Sportifs, Paris 2011, p. 292, para. 717.
8 Id. p. 313-314.
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The OLG also accepted that the imposition of an arbitration agreement 
referring to the CAS does not constitute per se an abuse of the market power, 
since this is justified by the necessity of a uniform sports jurisdiction instead of the 
intervention of different state jurisdictions in the disputes between the athletes and 
the sports federations related to international competitions. The OLG stated that 
this would prevent that divergent decisions are rendered in similar cases and thus 
facilitate to maintain equal opportunities for the athletes.
Structure of CAS, Its Independence and Neutrality
The OLG first underlined that the imposition of the arbitration agreement 
by the ISU would not constitute per se an abuse of its dominant position but then 
concluded that there is such abuse in the given case, when one takes the structural 
imbalance of the CAS into account. According to the OLG, the sports governing 
bodies have a significant influence on the mechanisms of appointing the arbitrators 
and this influence threatens the independence and neutrality of the CAS. 
Article S6 (3) of the CAS Code prescribes that the list of arbitrators be 
appointed by the International Council of Arbitration for Sport (ICAS). As this 
is a closed list, it can be said that there is a limited party autonomy concerning the 
appointment of arbitrators. However, this does not seem to be the biggest problem 
about the structure of the CAS, as the the Swiss Federal Supreme Court also rightly 
stated: There is a long list of arbitrators among which each party can choose the most 
appropriate one according to different criteria such as nationality, language and sport 
practiced by the athlete.9 
According to the OLG, the main problem lies with the composition of the 
ICAS, which is the sole actor in the compilation of the list of CAS arbitrators. 
According to Article S4 of the CAS Code, the ICAS is composed of 20 members, 
among which four members are appointed by the international sports federations; 
four members are appointed by the Association of the National Olympic Committees; 
four members are appointed by the International Olympic Committee (IOC); four 
members are appointed by the twelve members of the ICAS listed above, after 
appropriate consultation with a view to safeguarding the interests of the athletes 
and the last four members are appointed by the sixteen members of  the ICAS listed 
above. When this composition is analyzed, it can be clearly seen that the members of 
the ICAS are mostly appointed by the sports governing bodies, whereas the athletes’ 
unions, clubs or other stakeholders of the sport industry do not have any active role 
9 Schweizerisches Bundesgericht, 27 May 2003, BGE 129 III 445, para. 3.3.3.2. available at http://www.
polyreg.ch/bgepub/Band_129_2003/BGE_129_III_445.html (last visited 2 February 2016).      
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in this process. Taking into consideration that the list of arbitrators is compiled by 
the ICAS, the OLG concluded that this structure would enable the sports governing 
bodies to have a greater influence on the appointment of arbitrators and this influence 
would bring the neutrality of the CAS into question, in particular in the disputes 
between the sports governing bodies and the athletes, which is the case of Pechstein, 
who was banned by the ISU from competitions for two years. 
Having said that, this is not the only reason emphasized by the OLG. According 
to the court, another important structural deficiency is that Article 54 of the CAS 
Code stipulates a direct intervention of the President of the Appeals Arbitration 
Division of the CAS with the appointment of arbitrators in a given dispute. The 
provision prescribes that the President of the Appeals Division shall appoint the 
sole arbitrator, if a sole arbitrator is to be appointed and if three arbitrators are to be 
appointed, the President of the Appeals Division shall appoint the President of the 
Panel. As the President of the Appeals Division is one of the twenty members of the 
ICAS, the OLG concluded that the sports federations can have an indirect influence 
on the President of the Panel. 
Subsequently, the OLG found that Pechstein would not have consented to 
the arbitration agreement referring to the CAS with its current structural imbalance, 
if the ISU had not the monopolistic position in the market that allowed it to impose 
such agreement upon the athlete. As a result, the court decided that the ISU abused 
its dominant position in the market and the arbitration agreement, which was the 
consequence of this abuse, was construed as invalid on grounds of the German public 
policy.
Evaluation According to EU Competition Law 
The possible future impacts of this decision on European sports law should 
be analyzed within the framework of EU competition law, in particular in terms of 
Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), which 
prohibits the abusive conduct by undertakings of a dominant position. As professional 
sport constitutes an economic activity, it is evaluated under the scope of EU law10. 
The first encounter of the EU law and sport was the Walrave judgment of the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ)11, where the matter of dispute was a competition 
rule prescribing that the members of a team must be from the same nationality and 
10 Weatherill, S., European Sports Law: Collected Papers, The Hague 2014, p. 150.
11 European Court of Justice, 12 December 1974, C-36/74, available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/
showPdf.jsf?text=&docid=88848&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1
&cid=483679 (last visited 2 February 2016).      
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the rule was claimed to be against the prohibition of national discrimination under 
EU law. The court found no violation by emphasizing that  the restriction based on 
nationality was of “purely sporting interest” and it would not constitute a violation, 
as long as it remains limited to its proper objective.12 
Although there were several sports related disputes before the ECJ after Walrave, 
the Meca-Medina judgment13 became the first one that addressed the application of 
EU competition law to regulatory rules in sport.14 In the case, the athletes claimed 
that certain rules adopted by the IOC and implemented by the International 
Swimming Federation relating to doping control were incompatible with EU rules 
on competition and freedom to provide services. The court first underlined that “the 
mere fact that a rule is purely sporting in nature does not exclude the application 
of the TFEU”15; however then found that the anti-doping rules do not constitute a 
restriction of competition incompatible with the common market, since they were 
justified by a legitimate objective, which is to ensure healthy rivalry between athletes, 
and the rules were proportionate with this purpose.16 
In conclusion, we can say that the ECJ applies a gradual test in order to 
determine whether there is a violation when applying the EU law to sports related 
disputes. First of all, it analyzes whether the rule/practice is of a “purely sporting 
interest”, but an affirmative answer to this question does not suffice to exclude the 
application of EU law, unless the rule/practice is related to a non-economic activity. 
If it reflects a “purely sporting interest” and has an economic effect on the market at 
the same time, the rule/practice will be subject to EU law.17 
Then the court would ask whether the rule/practice has a legitimate purpose 
and whether it is limited to and proportionate with this purpose. The test of 
proportionality requires a transparent, objective and non-discriminatory application 
of the rule.18 In the case that the rule in question passes this test as well, it can escape 
from the finding of a violation in virtue of the specificity of sports. 
12 Pijetlovic, K., EU Sports Law and Breakway Leagues in Football, The Hague 2015, p. 102-103. 
13 European Court of Justice, 18 July 2006, C-519/04 P, available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/docu-
ment/document.jsf;jsessionid=9ea7d0f130d55f4d7bbf4b1243bdb8dbf8966a3a76b3.e34KaxiLc3eQc4
0LaxqMbN4Oc3aKe0?text=&docid=57022&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=firs
t&part=1&cid=478759  (last visited 2 February 2016).
14 Pijetlovic, K., p. 179.
15 European Court of Justice, 18 July 2006, C-519/04 P, para. 27. 
16 Id. at para. 45.
17 Parrish, R., Sports Law and Policy in the European Union, Manchester/New York 2003, p. 100.
18 Siekmann, R.C.R., Introduction to International and European Sports Law: Capita Selecta, The Hague 
2012, p.121. 
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The decision of the OLG might motivate the athletes, who are unhappy with 
the CAS awards, to refer similar cases to their respective national courts.19 In such 
a scenario, the gradual test conducted by the ECJ would gain more importance. In 
the Pechstein case, the unilateral imposition of the arbitration agreement may be 
deemed to have legitimate purposes such as timeliness of the resolution of sports 
related disputes, the uniformity of the jurisdiction in similar cases and the necessity 
to provide the athletes with equal opportunities. However, it is disputable whether 
this practice of the sports federations would pass the last threshold, which is the 
proportionality test, given the fact that the institutional structure of the CAS is at 
stake for the first time. It is open to discussion whether the indirect influence of 
the sports governing bodies on the appointment of arbitrators through the ICAS 
would suffice to conclude that the imposition of the arbitration agreement is not 
proportionate with the above stated purposes. 
If the Bundesgerichthof is convinced by the finding of the OLG and upholds 
its decision, this would be the signal flare of a reform in the CAS and ICAS that 
would allow other stakeholders of the sport industry, such as the athletes and the 
clubs, to gain a more active role in the compilation of the list of CAS arbitrators.
19 Favre-Bulle, X., p. 348.
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